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  2  Abstract
* 
 
This paper fills a void in the issue of determinants of privatization prices by 
concentrating in one industry across many countries. This has not been done 
before, as the literature has only focused on (i) many industries in one country, (ii) 
a single industry in one country, and (iii) many industries in many countries. We 
complement a recently released database with newly collected data, and we are 
able to cover 84 telecommunications privatizations, which account for nearly 80 
percent of the sector in terms of value. Our findings are consistent with the little 
existing work on privatization prices, as our best policy prescription is primarily 
to concentrate on the transparency and cleanliness of the privatization process, as 
sale methods do matter. We show that government administration of labor 
downsizing may result in adverse selection, as the best workers are the first to 
leave when given the opportunity. 
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  3    4  1.  Introduction 
 
There are two basic views with respect to whether streamlining before privatization is the right 
approach in the privatization process of state-owned enterprises.   On the one hand, it is argued 
that governments are better off streamlining firms before privatization as such measures may 
enhance the trustworthiness of the process. This credibility view is relevant in face of the 
potentially large political costs of labor streamlining, as willingness to overcome worker 
resistance may be interpreted as a signal of commitment to reform (Kikeri, Nellis, and Shirley, 
1992; Rama, 1999). A similar view that supports prior streamlining is the social view by which 
any social consequences of streamlining, especially labor-related streamlining, may be addressed 
more adequately by governments, for example, by ensuring payment of severance obligations 
and other social safety net measures.  In fact, the public sector may be better at bargaining with 
unions if the government has mechanisms to assist displaced workers, such as retraining 
programs, job search assistance, and severance payments (López-de-Silanes, 1997).   
Streamlining prior to privatization, either through the credibility or the social view, is expected to 
increase the attractiveness and value of the firm, which should be reflected in increased 
privatization sale prices.  
On the other hand, it has been argued that it is not worth spending resources in 
streamlining the firm before privatization, as governments may not be able to manage the 
downsizing process correctly. The classic example in this area is related to the labor force. 
According to this managerial view, governments that administer human resources risk 
retrenching the wrong, more productive personnel. This may result in the loss of know-how that, 
at a minimum, may yield short-run post-privatization efficiency problems and, at worst may be 
linked with permanent damage to the productive structure of the firm.  Dismissal of workers 
whom the new owners would rather retain may not add value to the firm and consequently may 
reduce privatization prices.  This is particularly true in developing countries where available 
information is even more lacking (Rama, 1999; Kahn, 1985; Jeon and Laffont, 1999). Another 
argument against streamlining before privatization is the political view, where firm streamlining 
depends on the extent to which unions are able to influence the future of politicians who, in turn, 
care about votes which in case of any labor changes may yield a government with weakened 
bargaining power. It is expected that unions will try to block the privatization, which will result 
  5  in excess cost to buyers and a negative link with privatization prices  (Freeman, 1986; Boycko, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1996).  
Although quite scarce, the existing empirical literature on streamlining and privatization 
prices appears to support a non-interventionist approach.  In fact, the research dealing with this 
issue appears to support views along the lines of Kahn (1985); Freeman, (1986); and Boycko, 
Shleifer and Vishny, (1996). For instance, the seminal work of López-de-Silanes (1997) uses 
information on characteristics and firm policies for 263 firms privatized in Mexico between 1983 
and 1992 and finds that their impact on privatization prices are low. He finds that prices are 
sensitive to competition in the auction process, lengthier privatizations are associated with lower 
premiums, and that labor downsizing prior to privatization may not be worth its cost. Given the 
costs of prior streamlining policies, López-de-Silanes draws the lesson that governments should 
not focus on such labor policies, but on simply selling.   
Research by Peren Arin and Okten (2001) use ordinary least squares to analyze the 
determinants of privatization using a relatively small number of Turkish firms. They claim that 
revenue, market characteristics, and profits are significant determinants of a measure of 
privatization prices adjusted by sales. Unlike Lopez-de-Silanes (1997) they also focus their study 
on a single industry (cement) and find that their results diverge as profit margins and other 
profitability and efficiency measures become non-significant in a single-industry set-up. While 
differences between a single industry and heterogeneous sample remains an issue, these 
researchers claim that governments should not engage in streamlining policies and investment 
prior to privatization.  
Finally, work by Chong and López-de-Silanes (2002) focuses on the issue of labor 
streamlining on privatization prices using a cross-section of 400 firms around the world for the 
period 1983-2000. They find that labor retrenchment has little impact on privatization prices, and 
argue that this may be due to the presence of adverse selection in the process of laying-off 
workers before privatization. They provide further evidence of this by using firm re-hires after 
privatization as a proxy of the quality of the retrenchment program. In fact, they find that those 
groups in which labor retrenchment yields a negative link with prices are also the ones with 
highest probability of re-hiring workers that were fired prior to privatization.  
Despite the fact that all the research above points towards non-intervention, some critics 
have argued that further empirical research on this issue is advisable (Megginson and Netter, 
  6  2001), given the critical policy implications that may be derived from any conclusions.   In fact, 
in this paper we complement the existing empirical literature by focusing on a single industry 
using a cross-section of firms and countries. This approach has not been taken before. In fact, the 
existing literature has focused either on (i) many industries in one country, (ii) a single industry 
in one country, or in (iii) many industries in many countries.  For instance, the studies by López-
de-Silanes (1997) and Peren Arin and Okten (2001) are for single developing countries in several 
industries, which makes wider application problematic.
1  Additionally, the latter also provide 
some evidence on a single industry (cement) in a single country, Turkey.  Finally, Chong and 
López-de-Silanes (2002) consider several developed and developing countries in many 
industries. Thus, the natural complement to the existing empirical research is to focus on several 
countries but on a single industry in order to test for unobserved industry heterogeneity. 
This study provides cross-country evidence on firm characteristics and streamlining 
policies in the privatization process for a single industry, telecommunications.  We explore the 
links of the characteristics and policies taken during the process with net privatization prices. 
Our empirical research benefits from a wide-ranging database that includes most 
telecommunication firms that were privatized during the period 1984 and 2000, as we consider 
84 privatizations in total. While we use the database by Chong and López-de-Silanes (2002) we 
were able to expand it, by including data for telecommunications firms that account for an 
additional 5 percent of the original sample. The list of telecommunications firms used in this 
study is shown in Appendix 1. 
We find that when controlling for endogeneity, streamlining policies do not appear to 
reduce net privatization prices, as defined by the amount that accrues to the government after all 
costs are taken into account, adjusted by shares sold, and controlled by average sales during the 
three years prior to privatization. Although this finding may appear somewhat counterintuitive, 
as, according to the conventional wisdom, sellers will always want the government to restructure 
prior to privatization, it is fairly consistent with a non-intervention view of the world along the 
lines of Freeman (1986), Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996), Rama (1999), and others.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data collection process, 
explains how the key variables were constructed and discusses the empirical methodology.  In 
                                                 
1 Lack of control for endogeneity in Peren Arin and Otken (2001) may be considered a problem, too.  López-de-
Silanes (1997) stresses the need to control for endogeneity, and he shows that his results vary widely when 
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Our sample is based on a list of privatizations in the world covering the period 1984-2000 
originally compiled by Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes (2002).
2  These researchers prepared a 
detailed questionnaire addressed to the CEO with a recommendation to direct it to the chief 
financial officer and the director of human resources of the corresponding firms (Chong and 
López-de-Silanes, 2002). They also used additional sources extensively.
3  In this study we were 
able to expand their sample for telecommunications firms of Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes (2002) 
by five percent by using three additional sources: the firms themselves, the regulatory agencies, 
and the International Telecommunications Union. We followed the same procedure as these 
researchers. That is, we organized a questionnaire in four areas. The first area covered pre-
privatization firm characteristics, with questions on sales, assets, profits, liabilities, management 
changes, and sector of origin. The second area covered pre-privatization characteristics and 
policies, with some emphasis on labor issues, such as the incidence of unions, number of strikes, 
political affiliation of unions, labor streamlining measures and targets.  The third area focused on 
the privatization process, and in particular, on privatization prices, the transaction methods used, 
shares sold, and foreign participation.   
We were able to obtain information for 84 privatizations for the period 1984-2000.  Our 
sample covers about 75 percent of the privatizations carried out in the telecommunications sector 
worldwide and they account for an estimated 80 percent of the revenues brought in by 
privatizations in the sector worldwide during the 1990s (World Bank, 2001).  In fact, the 
geographic, year, and revenue distribution of our sample is similar to the corresponding 
distributions of the population of firms that were privatized in the sector (Chong and López-de-
                                                                                                                                                             
endogeneity is not controlled for. 
2 Chong and López-de-Silanes (2002) excluded voucher privatizations on the grounds that there are fundamental 
differences between such privatization technique and others, which would have made comparisons particularly 
difficult (Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994).  
3 These additional resources consisted principally of the World Bank’s intranet system, which provided access to 
internal documents, NEXIS, which facilitated searches in national and international publications, and interviews 
  8  Silanes, 2002).  Consequently, it is reasonable to believe that our sample is representative of the 
non-voucher privatizations in telecommunications around the world.  Figure 1 presents the 
distribution of privatizations in telecommunications in our sample. Around half of the operations 
occurred during the mid-1990s or before, while the other half occurred during the mid-1990s or 
later. Figure 2 shows the distribution of our sample by region of the world.  Around 27 percent of 
the privatizations in our sample are from Latin America, 10 percent from Asia, 13 percent from 
Africa and the Middle East, 35 percent from developed countries, and 14 percent from Transition 
Economies. 
  Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables used in this paper. The set of 
variables is organized according to firm and privatization characteristics, labor characteristics, 
labor policies, and macroeconomic variables, along the lines of the questionnaire distributed to 
firms, as detailed above.  The net privatization price is defined as the amount that accrues to the 
government after all privatization and streamlining costs are taken into account, such as 
government commitments at the time of sale, and other adjustments are made to the sale 
contract.  This number is adjusted by the percentage of company shares sold and divided by the 
average net sales during the three years prior to privatization. The present value of the resulting 
number as of December 2000 is the dependent variable employed, which is labeled “Net 
Privatization Price/ Sales.”  The key explanatory variables of interest are (i) the share of the firm 
that was sold; (ii) the type of sale used, whether public offering, direct sale, or other;  (iii) the 
labor characteristics of the firm, in particular the presence of unions and the extent of strikes; (iv) 
the labor policies of the firm, such as retrenchment and pay-cuts; and (v) macroeconomic 
controls, such as the rate of inflation and the gross domestic product of the country. Appendix 2 
provides definitions of this specific variable and all the others used in this paper. 
Table 2 provides some basic information on our variables of interest according to region.  
On average, about one-third of the shares of state-owned telecommunications enterprises were 
sold. In the case of Latin America, shares sold reached around 53 percent, compared to only 22 
percent in Asia.  Similarly, foreign participation occurred in the great majority of operations 
around the world and in no case was it lower than 82 percent, the figure for Africa.  Additionally, 
public offerings were the most common way of selling state-owned enterprises in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
with officials from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Inter-American Development Bank 
associated with privatization programs, and privatization offices or corresponding ministries. 
  9  telecommunications sector as, on average, they represented almost 90 percent of the methods 
used. Industrial countries, with 97 percent, used public offerings overwhelmingly, while Latin 
America is the region that used this method the least, with 78 percent. In fact, in the latter region, 
direct sales represented about 17 percent, the highest level among all regions.   
In terms of labor characteristics, the most unionized firms were found in transition 
economies, developed countries, and Latin America, with 100 percent, 93 percent, and 91 
percent, respectively. The least unionized region is Asia, with one in four workers in the 
telecommunications sector belonging to unions.  This fact is loosely reflected in the incidence of 
strikes in the sector.  In fact, firms in Latin America and Transition Economies are the ones with 
the highest number of strikes up to three years prior to privatization, with 61 percent and 58 
percent of firms having had strikes, respectively. Labor downsizing was employed in developed 
countries and Latin America more frequently than any other region.  In fact, 80 percent of firms 
from industrial countries and 74 percent of firms in Latin America retrenched their labor force 
three years prior to privatization. The labor-downsizing variable may be viewed as a basic 
summary measure of labor streamlining, as it is typically the most widely employed and most 
relevant from a policy perspective.  
Finally, two other labor-related measures considered are pay-cut three years prior to 
privatization, and the presence of employment guarantees. While not very many firms made use 
of the first, about one third of firms in Transition Economies and one fourth of firms in Latin 
America applied employment guarantees. 
Table 3 provides a first analysis of the data. We divide the sample into two groups 
according to whether any labor streamlining did or did not take place in a state-owned enterprise.  
The table shows the value of the mean and median of the share adjusted net privatization prices 
of the firms, the difference in net price means and medians, and the t-statistic and z-statistics 
associated with such difference in means and medians, respectively.  Foreign participation in the 
privatization of the telecommunications firm is linked with increased net privatization price 
though such link is not statistically significant.  Public offerings, on the other hand, appear to be 
positively linked with prices, as the group of state-owned enterprises where public offerings 
occurred fetched higher net privatization prices that yielded statistically significant differences in 
means and medians.  Interestingly, direct sales yield statistically significant lower privatization 
prices with respect to other sales methods. Labor streamlining policies, and in particular, labor 
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and medians even though the group that followed the policy fetched lower prices. Finally, 
employment guarantees and pay cuts do yield statistically significant differences between the 
treated and the untreated group. As expected, firms that applied pay cut policies prior to 
privatization fetched higher prices, while those that guaranteed jobs fetched lower prices. 
The findings above, however, do not take into consideration the fact that more than one 
variable may be affecting the outcome in terms of prices and that potential a endogeneity 
problem may be at play.  In fact, it may be argued that the firms that restructure are the ones that 
need to do so, as they are precisely the worst performers. As López-de-Silanes (1997) shows, 
results may vary widely once reverse causality is taken into account.  From this perspective the 
results above should be taken as preliminary and should be further studied when more than one 
control is present and when reverse causality may be an issue. 
 
3. Basic Finding 
 
In this section we present regression analysis on the link between streamlining policies and net 
privatization prices. As explained above, we calculate the net present value of the privatization 
price calculated after all privatization and streamlining costs are taken into account, adjusted by 
shares sold. This resulting number is our dependent variable.
4  Net privatization prices are 
regressed against a set of variables that has been classified in five groups. The first category is 
firm and privatization characteristics. We use a dummy that equals one when net total liabilities 
are greater than zero for the average of the three years prior to privatization, and zero otherwise; 
and a dummy variable that equals one when foreign participation was allowed and zero 
otherwise.  We also consider the type of sale. In particular, we consider a dummy that equals one 
when the privatization was carried out using an initial public offering, and zero otherwise; and a 
dummy that equals one if the privatization was carried out through a direct sale, and zero 
otherwise. The second group includes firm labor characteristics, as reflected by the presence of 
unions and the existence of strikes and related physical protests on the last three years before 
privatization.  A dummy equals one if unions were present up to three years prior to 
                                                 
4 López-de-Silanes (1997) also uses the firms’ total assets and total liabilities to develop a so-called Privatization Q. 
In our case, such data was not possible to obtain. However, as a rough proxy in our regressions we include a dummy 
variable when total liabilities are greater than total assets.  
  11  privatization, and zero otherwise. Similarly, dummy variable equals one if there were strikes up 
to three years prior to privatization, and zero otherwise. The third group reflects labor-
streamlining policies applied up to three years prior to privatization, in particular, employment 
guarantees, pay cuts, and labor cuts including whether such labor cuts were compulsory or 
voluntary. As in the other categories, we constructed dummy variables equal to one when the 
issue in question occurred, and zero otherwise.  Finally, the last group includes country-specific 
macroeconomic variables, in particular, the gross domestic product and the rate of inflation.
5 
The first column in Table 4 presents our basic results. In this section we use a simple 
ordinary least squares approach and assume that labor-streamlining policies are exogenous. With 
respect to the first group of variables, firm and privatization characteristics, we find a negative 
and statistically significant coefficient in the case of net liabilities, as expected (López-de-
Silanes, 1997). Firms with net negative liabilities are   associated with a privatization price 4 
percent lower. We also find that the share of the telecommunications firm that is privatized has a 
negative and weakly statistically significant link with prices.  In fact, an additional 10 percent of 
privatized share decreases privatization prices by 3 percent. Public offerings yield a positive and 
statistically significant sign and are associated with a 90 percent increase in privatization price. 
Additionally, the presence of foreign participation yields a positive and statistically significant 
link with privatization prices that is equal to a 6 percent reduction in prices (Dewenter and 
Malatesta, 1997; López-de-Silanes, 1997). 
With respect to labor characteristics we find that the presence of unions prior to 
privatization is associated with a privatization price 20 percent lower, as the sign of the 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant at 5 percent. Similarly, we find that strikes and 
other forms of physical protest are negatively linked with privatization prices. Since unions and 
strikes are relatively highly correlated it is not surprising that the latter yields a statistically non-
significant coefficient.
6  When focusing on the set of labor streamlining variables, we find that 
downsizing is negative and non-significant with respect to privatization prices.  Similarly, 
employment guarantees prior to privatization yield a negative and statistical non-significant 
coefficient. If maximizing revenues is the sole objective of policymakers, applying this kind of 
                                                 
5 Since we are including country variables, regressions with country fixed effects are thus not reported. We repeated 
all our empirical specifications excluding country controls and using country fixed effects instead. As expected, our 
results do not vary. 
  12  policy does not clearly support such an objective.
7  Similarly, pay cuts prior to privatization are 
associated with higher privatization prices, as the resulting coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant at five percent.  Finally, macroeconomic controls, particular, the average gross 
domestic product three years before privatization, yield a positive and statistically significant 
link with net privatization prices.  The rate of inflation, on the other hand, yields a non-
statistically significant negative link with net privatization prices. 
The second column in Table 4 replicates the specification above but places some focus on 
the composition of labor downsizing by including a dummy variable on whether retrenchment in 
the firm was voluntary or not. This emphasis reflects recent claims for the need to study the labor 
economics of pre- and post-privatization transactions, as there is almost no research on labor 
issues, despite the fact that it is a critical issue from a policy perspective (Megginson and Netter, 
2001; Chong and López-de-Silanes, 2002). We find that voluntary downsizing, whereby workers 
freely choose to leave their jobs, usually when monetary or non-monetary incentives are offered, 
is negatively and weakly statistically significantly linked with a net privatization price 11 percent 
lower.  Firms that retrench workers prior to privatization do not get a premium in terms of prices, 
as prospective buyers are not more interested in buying such firms. Worse, the fact that the 
resulting sign is weakly statistically significant is consistent with the multi-industry findings by 
Chong and López-de-Silanes (2002) and may suggest that adverse selection may be a problem 
along the lines of theoretical work by Kahn (1985), Jeon and Laffont (1999) and Rama (1999).  
According to this application of asymmetric information theory, the most productive workers in 
state-owned firms are aware of their productivity and are thus more likely to take the offered 
severance package and leave voluntarily, as their chances of obtaining a job outside of the public 
sector will be relatively high. On the other hand, less productive workers will rather stay in the 
public sector when voluntary retrenchment schemes are offered.  Since they are not as 
productive, skilled, or able, these workers would rather cling to their public sector job instead of 
searching for a job outside of the public sector where their chances of obtaining a position are 
relatively lower (Rama, 1999).  
                                                                                                                                                             
6 In fact, when excluding the unions variable or constructing a combined “unions-strikes” variable, the signs are 
negative and statistically significant at 1 percent. 
7 However, governments frequently have more than one objective, and those objectives are frequently contradictory. 
objectives. The value of this finding from a policy perspective is, perhaps, to make policymakers aware that there 
appears to be a trade-off between objectives and their cost. 
  13  In summary, under the assumption of exogeneity in the explanatory variables, our 
findings appear to support the idea that (i) the characteristics of the firm are important 
determinants of privatization prices, as firms in worse shape will not be sold at higher prices, (ii) 
foreign participation does not increase privatization prices, (iii) the type of method used in the 
sale matters; (iii) labor characteristics, such as the presence of unions before privatization, are 
negatively linked with prices; and (iv) a few labor policies are conducive to higher privatization 
prices, in particular, pay cuts before privatization. On the other hand, some other labor measures 
appear to be very counterproductive, such as voluntary downsizing, as it appears to produce 
adverse selection in the labor reduction process. 
  
4. Instrumental Variables 
 
The findings above do not take into account potential endogeneity problems and therefore the 
findings lack credibility. Endogeneity may arise as governments try to restructure the labor force 
of the state-owned telecom enterprises before the sale in order to raise the privatization price. For 
instance, if the unobservable characteristics of a firm are positively correlated with the presence 
of strong unions, the government may be particularly interested in dismantling such unions 
(López-de-Silanes, 1997).  Using a method developed by López-de-Silanes (1997), the first step 
describes the determinants of prior labor streamlining measures undertaken mainly, but not 
necessarily, by politicians.  All of them are binary choices, such as the decision to downsize, 
implement pay cuts, break unions, or reduce strikes.  The first step estimates a reduced-form 
equation that describes the probability that such a restructuring policy may be implemented. This 
set of variables consists of what López-de-Silanes calls excluded instruments, as they are not 
included in the privatization price equation. This instruments have very low statistical power 
when included directly in the price equation, but they are highly correlated with the labor 
streamlining actions of the firm, as shown by applying F-statistics to test for the joint hypothesis 
that they are all equal to zero. Appendix 3 provides the first stage employed in the case of unions 
and strikes. The F-statistic of the excluded instruments is higher than 3, suggesting that the first 
stage was adequately specified.
8 
                                                 
8  Because of space considerations we did not include first stages for all the variables in which endogeneity was 
corrected. We would be happy to do so upon request. 
  14  Table 5 shows our findings when correcting for endogeneity when using instrumental 
variables method described above. With respect to privatization characteristics the results are 
very similar. Net total liabilities are still negative and statistically significant, and they are 
associated with a 15 percent decrease in privatization price. Foreign participation and public 
offerings are associated with a 7 and 100 percent increase in privatization price, respectively. On 
the other hand, the coefficients of the labor characteristics variables are always negative and 
statistically significant in the case of unions. The presence of unions in the firm is associated 
with a 30 percent decrease in the privatization price.  
Finally, with respect to labor-streamlining policies, we find that even though all the 
variables considered keep the same signs as the non-instrumented regressions, they do not have 
statistical significance. These findings indicate that when controlling for endogeneity, labor-
streamlining policies do not significantly increase net privatization prices. However, the fact that 
labor downsizing yields a negative though non-statistically significant sign is intriguing. After 
all, conventional wisdom has it that prospective buyers will always prefer that governments get 
rid of labor before privatization whenever possible. Again, the nature of the labor downsizing 
process may be an issue to explore. 
An indication that this may be the case is shown in column 2 in Table 5 when voluntary 
downsizing is used as an explanatory variable, instead. This variable yields a negative and 
statistically significant sign at 5 percent. As in the ordinary least squares case, this result suggests 
that adverse selection may be an issue as workers with the best outside prospects will leave and 
those with the worst outside perspectives will tend to stay. In fact, voluntary downsizing is 
associated with a 15 percent decrease in the privatization price.  
While the overall results do not differ much with respect to the ordinary least squares 
findings, they do vary in some important ways, especially in regard to labor force retrenchment. 
While the ordinary least squares findings suggest that some labor downsizing methods, such as 
pay cuts prior to privatization, may be worth the effort, our findings using instrumental variables 
suggest that no single labor policy prior to privatization is worth the effort, as each of them 
yields no statistical significance, and when it does, as in the case of voluntary downsizing, the 
resulting sign yields the undesired sign, a strong suggestion of adverse selection. To some extent, 
this finding is consistent with the argument by López de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) and 
by Freeman (1986) that there is a negative link between restructuring and net privatization 
  15  prices. In addition, as shown in work by López-de-Silanes (1997), Peren Arin and Okten (2001) 
and Chong and López-de-Silanes (2002) the best strategy appears to be not to do much and 
simply concentrate on setting up a transparent process, as the method of sale does matter. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
Despite the fact that researchers have claimed that industry heterogeneity may be an important 
issue to consider when assessing net privatization prices, major data constraints have limited 
empirical studies. While existing empirical studies on determinants of privatization prices have 
focused on (i) many industries in one country, (ii) a single industry in one country, and in (iii) 
many industries in many countries, this paper fills a void by focusing on a sample covering one 
industry, telecommunications, across many countries. To do this, we complement a recently 
released database to which we add some newly collected data. We are able to cover 84 
telecommunications privatizations, which account for nearly 80 percent of the sector in terms of 
value. 
 When controlling for endogeneity, we find that characteristics of the firm are important 
determinants of privatization prices, as firms with negative net liabilities will not be able to fetch 
higher privatization prices. Similarly, we find that foreign participation in privatizations does not 
increase net privatization prices. Also, we find that labor characteristics, such as the presence of 
unions before privatization, are negatively linked with net privatization prices. However, we find 
that specific labor policies before privatization, such as retrenchment, pay cuts, and employment 
guarantees policies, may not be conducive to higher net privatization prices and, on the contrary, 
may be conducive to adverse selection in the particular case of voluntary downsizing. Overall, 
our findings are consistent with the growing existing literature on determinants of privatization 
prices, as our best policy prescription is not to do much, but rather to concentrate on the 
transparency and cleanliness of the privatization, as sale methods appear to matter in the 
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       Source: Data collected by authors and by Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes (2002). 
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  20  Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Firm Characteristic:
Net Privatization price/sales 84 0.84 0.87 0.27 0.12 1.37
Sales 84 3.46 1.38 5.03 0.00 21.99
Net total liabilities 84 0.44 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
Preprivatization profits 84 0.52 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
Privatization Characteristics:
Foreign participation 84 0.87 1.00 0.34 0.00 1.00
Share sold 84 0.34 0.30 0.20 0.01 0.95
Public offering 84 0.89 1.00 0.31 0.00 1.00
Direct Sale 84 0.07 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00
Labor Characteristics:
Unions 84 0.83 1.00 0.37 0.00 1.00
Strikes 84 0.45 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
Labor Policies:
Downsizing 84 0.73 1.00 0.45 0.00 1.00
Voluntary downsizing 84 0.19 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00
Employment  guarantee 84 0.18 0.00 0.39 0.00 1.00
Pay cut 84 0.17 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.00
Country-Specific Variables:
English common law 84 0.24 0.00 0.43 0.00 1.00
French commercial code 84 0.44 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
German commercial code 84 0.14 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00
Scandinavian commercial code 84 0.05 0.00 0.21 0.00 1.00
Socialist laws 84 0.131 0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00
Gross domestic product 84 25.46 25.65 2.14 19.45 28.86
Inflation 84 75.91 8.83 201.81 0.62 863.27
Growth 84 2.87 3.15 3.58 -11.14 12.82
Openness 84 40.62 31.17 47.45 5.12 314.59









Table 2. Streamlining Policies and Privatization Characteristics in the Telecommunications Sector 
Latin America 53.1% 87% 78.3% 17.4% 91.3% 60.8% 73.9% 17.4% 26.1%
Asia 22.2% 88% 87.5% 0.0% 25.0% 37.5% 62.5% 0.0% 0.0%
Africa and Middle East 26.3% 82% 90.9% 9.1% 63.6% 45.5% 63.6% 0.0% 36.4%
Developed Countries 25.5% 87% 96.7% 3.3% 93.3% 30.0% 80.0% 10.0% 3.3%
Transition Economies 42.0% 92% 91.7% 0.0% 100.0% 58.3% 66.7% 8.3% 33.3%
All 34.4% 86.9% 89.3% 7.1% 83.3% 45.2% 72.6% 9.5% 17.9%









Source: Data collected by authors and by Chong and López-de-Silanes (2002). 
 
 
  22  Table 3. Firm Characteristics and Streamlining in the Telecommunications Industry 
Tests of Means and Medians 
Foreign Participation 
mean 0.8354 0.8409 -0.061 -0.020
median 0.8555 0.8767
Public Offering
mean 0.6439 0.8592 -2.300 *** -1.974 **
median 0.6702 0.8796
Direct Sale
mean 0.8522 0.6281 1.976 ** 2.136 **
median 0.8814 0.6365
Downsizing
mean 0.8677 0.8242 0.650 0.296
median 0.8767 0.8595
Pay Cut
mean 0.8040 0.9969 -2.495 ** -2.196 **
median 0.8575 0.9850
Employment Guarantee
mean 0.8761 0.6523 3.025 *** 3.369 ***
median 0.9037 0.6702
Voluntary Downsizing
mean 0.8524 0.7673 1.127 1.105
median 0.8840 0.7779
Level  of  Significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
1/ T-test for Ho about difference between means. Unequal N's
















Note: This table reports mean and median values of the privatization price/sales in the group of firms both 
where the measure on the rows was present compared to those firms where such measure was not present. 
The presence of particular measure is indicated in the lines (foreign participation, public offering, direct 
sale, downsizing, pay-cut, employment guarantee, and voluntary downsizing). The third column shows 
the t-statistics of the difference in means of the two groups respectively.  The fourth column reports the z-
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 Table 4.  Determinants of Privatization Prices in the Telecommunications Sector 
Dependent Variable: Net Privatization Prices/Sales 
Ordinary Least Squares 
 
1.- Firm and privatization characteristics:
Net total liabilities -0.0586 ** -0.0592 ***
(0.023) (0.022)
Share Sold -0.0046 * -0.0041
(0.003) (0.003)
Foreign participation 0.0175 0.011
(0.055) (0.057)
Public offering 0.3783 ** 0.3809 **
(0.166) (0.174)
Direct Sale 0.4121 ** 0.3859 **
(0.181) (0.187)
2.- Labor Characteristics:




3-  Labor Policies:
Downsizing -0.0448
(0.037)
Voluntary downsizing -0.092 *
(0.053)
Employment  guarantee -0.0225 -0.0148
(0.041) (0.037)
Pay cut 0.0856 ** 0.0755 **
(0.036) (0.037)
4.- M acroeconomic Variables:
Gross Domestic Product  0.0932 *** 0.0939 ***
(0.009) (0.008)
Inflation -0.0001 -0.0001 *
(0.000) (0.000)





Prob > F       0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Note: The dependent variable is net privatization price/sales, defined as the amount that accrues to the 
government after all privatization and restructuring costs are taken into account, such as government 
commitments at the time of sale, and other adjustments are made to the sale contract.  This number is 
adjusted by the percentage of company shares sold and is divided by the average net sales during the 
three years prior to privatization. The present value of the resulting number as of December 2000 is 
used.  
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 Table 5. Determinants of Privatization Prices in the Telecommunications Sector 
Dependent Variable: Net Privatization Prices/Sales 
 
 
1.- Firm and privatization characteristics: 
Net total liabilities  -0.0874        ** -0.0895  ***
(0.036) (0.032) 
Share Sold  -0.0048 * -0.0046 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Foreign participation  0.0425 0.0364 
(0.040) (0.040) 
Public offering  0.3672 ** 0.3552  **
(0.154) (0.155) 
Direct Sale  0.4081 ** 0.4122  **
(0.171) (0.168) 
2.- Labor Characteristics: 
Unions  -0.1669 ** -0.2391  ***
(0.068) (0.069) 
Strikes  -0.0842 ** 0.0159 
(0.040) (0.027) 
3.-  Labor Policies: 
Downsizing  -0.0849
(0.053)
Voluntary downsizing  -0.0647  **
(0.025) 
Employment  guarantee  -0.0204 -0.0292 
(0.044) (0.042) 
Pay cut  -0.0767 -0.1199 
(0.085) (0.089) 
4.- Macroeconomic Variables: 
Gross Domestic Product   0.0969 *** 0.0968  ***
(0.013) (0.012) 
Inflation  -0.0001 * -0.0001  ***
(0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  -1.9144 *** -2.0108  ***
(0.413) (0.394) 
Observations  84 84 
R-squared  0.764 0.786 
F  24.03 26.53 
Prob > F        0.000 0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  







Note on Instrumental Variables: The dependent variable is net privatization price/sales, defined as the 
amount that accrues to the government after all privatization and restructuring costs are taken into 
account, such as government commitments at the time of sale, and other adjustments are made to the 
sale contract.  This number is adjusted by the percentage of company shares sold and is divided by the 
average net sales during the three years prior to privatization. The present value of the resulting number 
as of December 2000 is used.  
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 Appendix 1. Firms and Countries 
 
Company Country Year of privatization
Albanian Mobile Communications Albania 2000
Belgacom Belgium 1995
Belize Telecommunications Ltd. Belize 1988
Bezeq Israel 1998
British Telecom United Kingdom 1984 , 1991
Bulgarian Telecommunications Co. Bulgaria 2000
CANTV Venezuela 1991
CTE El Salvador 1998
Cabo Verde Telecom Cape Verde 1995
China Telecom- Hong Kong Ltd. China 1997
Compania de Telefonos Chile (CTC) Chile 1988
Deutsche Telekom Germany 1996 , 1999
ENTEL Bolivia 1995
Embratel SA Brazil 1998
Entel and CPT Peru 1994
Entel- Telecom  SA Argentina 1990
Entel- Telephonica de Argentina SA Argentina 1990
Estonia Telecom Estonia 1993 , 1999
France Telecom France 1997, 1998
Ghana Telecom Ghana 1996
Guyana Telephone and Telegraph Guyana 1991
H rvatske Telekom unicacije Croatia 1999
I NDOSAT I ndonesia 1994
INTEL El Salvador 1998
INTEL SA Panama 1997
Jordan Telecom Jordan 2000
Korea Telecom Korea, Rep. 1999
Lattelekom Latvia 1994
Lietuvos Telekomas Lithuania 1998
NTT Japan 1987, 1988, 1998, 1999
P.T.Telkom Indonesia 1995
Portugal Telecom Portugal 1995, 1996, 1997
Puerto Rico Telephone Co. (PRTC) Puerto Rico 1999
Q-tel Qatar 1998
Royal KPN Netherlands 1994 , 1995
SKANTEL St. Kitts and Nevis 1992 , 1994
SPT Telecom Czech Republic 1994
Singapore Telecommunications Singapore 1993 , 1996
Sonatel Senegal 1997
Sonera Finland 1998 , 1999
Sri Lanka Telecommunications Sri Lanka 1997
Svyazinvest Russian Federation 1997
Swisscom Switzerland 1998
Tele Centro Sul Brazil 1998
TeleDanmark Denmark 1998
Telecom Eireanne Ireland 1996
Telecom Italia Italy 1997
Telecom Serbia Yugoslavia, FR  1997
Telecommunications of Jamaica (TOJ) Jamaica 1990
Telefonica del Peru Peru 1996
Telekom  Austria Austria 1998
Telekomunikacja Polska SA Poland 1998 , 2000




Telkom South Africa 1997
Telstra Australia 1997 , 1999
Telus Canada 1990
Trinidad and Tobago Telephone Co. (T&TT) Trinidad and Tobago 1989
Uganda Telecommunications Ltd Uganda 2000




Net Privatization price/sales The net present value of the nominal price of sale in U.S dollars after all privatization and restructuring costs are taken 
into account adjusted by the percentage of company shares sold, and divided by total sales before privatization.
Sales The net present value of the three-year average of firm sales before privatization denominated in U.S dollars.
Net total liabilities Dummy variable equal to 1 if net total liabilities are greater than zero up to three years prior to privatization,
and 0 otherwise.
Preprivatization profits Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company make any profits up to three years prior to privatization, and 0 otherwise
Privatization Characteristics
Foreign participation Dummy variable equal to 1 if foreign participation was allowed in the privatization process, and 0 otherwise.
Share sold Percentage of firm's shares sold in privatization.
Type of sale Dummy variable equal to 1 to take into account for method of privatization sale. Two dummies are considered to account 
for initial public offering  an direct (non-competitive) sales respectively, and 0 otherwise (reflecting other methods such as 
purchases by employees, joint ventures, or secondary offerings).
Labor Characteristics
Unions Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm had unions up to three years prior to privatization, and  0 otherwise.
Political affiliation of unions Dummy variable equal to 1 if political affiliation of union is the same as the political party linked with the ruling government 
at the time of privatization, and 0 otherwise.
Strikes Dummy variable equal to 1 if there were any protest, picketing or strikes prior to privatization, and 0 
otherwise.
Labor Policies
Downsizing  Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm undertook any downsizing in the labor force up to three years prior to privatization, 0
otherwise. Downsizing may be classified as voluntary or compulsory.
Voluntary  downsizing Dummy variable equal to 1 if there was any kind of voluntary downsizing in the labor force three years prior to privatization,
 0 otherwise. Voluntary downsizing is defined as any non-compulsory, worker-based decision downsizing. Typically severance
packages, pension enhancements, and other benefits are offered to incentive workers to leave the firm.
Employment guarantee Dummy variable equal to 1 if there was any promise of employment guarantee up to three years prior to privatization,
Pay cut Dummy variable equal to 1 if there was any pay cut to the salary or wage of the worker three years prior to privatization,
 0 otherwise.
Country-Specific Variables
Law origin Legal origin of the country from which company is geographically based upon. Five possible legal origins considered:
English common law;   French civil code ;  German  commercial  code;  Scandinavian commercial code; and Socialist laws (La Porta, Lopez-
de- Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998).
Gross domestic product Gross Domestic Product  (US$ PPP) in logs. Average of the three years prior privatization (World Bank, 2001a).
Inflation Average rate of inflation in the country three years prior privatization (World Bank, 2001a).
Openness Average sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product three years prior 
to privatization (World Bank, 2001a).
Continental dummies Dummy equal to 1 if to account for the following regions: Latin America, Asia, Middle East and Africa, Developed Countries, 0 otherwise.




























Number of observations 84 
Pseudo R Squared 0.15
F-statistics on excluded instruments 3.02
Prob>F 0.001 
 
Note: This appendix presents the first-step regression of the two-step procedure 
for one of the potentially endogenous variables in this case for both unions and 
strikes.  Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Regressions include 
agent bank dummy (not reported). (***) Indicates significance at 1 percent; (**) 
indicates significance at 5 percent; (*) indicates significance at 10 percent. 
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